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Highlights 
 
Mirroring has been almost exclusively analysed in motor terms with no reference 
to the body that carries the action. According to the standard view, one activates 
motor representations upon seeing other people moving. Furthermore, most people 
have drawn the implications of those shared action representations for 3rd person 
mindreading (do they allow direct understanding RI RWKHU SHRSOH¶V LQWHQWLRQV" %\
contrast, this paper focuses on the existence of shared body representations rather than 
on shared action representations and on their implications for self-awareness, and in 
particular on the sense of bodily ownership (how do I recognize this body as my 
own?). 
To what extent does one recruit body representations in social context? And does it 
imply that body representations are shared between self and others? This latter 
question is all the more legitimate since recent evidence indicates the existence of 
shared cortical networks for bodily sensations, including pain (e.g., Singer et al., 
2004) and touch (e.g., Keysers et al., 2004; Blakemore et al., 2005). But if body 
representations are shared, then it seems that their activation cannot suffice to 
GLVFULPLQDWH EHWZHHQ RQH¶V ERG\ DQG RWKHU SHRSOH¶V ERGLHV 'R ZH WKHQ QHHG D
³:KRVH´V\VWHPWRUHFRJQL]Hour body as our own, in the same way that Jeannerod 
DUJXHGWKDWZHQHHGD³:KR´V\VWHPWRUHFRJQL]Hour actions as our own?  
 
 
*Highlights (for review)
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Shared body representations and the ³:KRVH´ system 
Frédérique de Vignemont 
Institut Jean Nicod 
CNRS-ENS-EHESS 
 
Abstract: 
Mirroring has been almost exclusively analysed in motor terms with no reference 
to the body that carries the action. According to the standard view, one activates 
motor representations upon seeing other people moving. However, one does not only 
VHHPRYHPHQWVRQHDOVRVHHVDQRWKHULQGLYLGXDO¶VERG\7KHIROORZLQJTXHVWLRQVWKHQ
arise. To what extent does one recruit body representations in social context? And 
does it imply that body representations are shared between self and others? This latter 
question is all the more legitimate since recent evidence indicates the existence of 
shared cortical networks for bodily sensations, including pain (e.g., Singer et al., 
2004) and touch (e.g., Keysers et al., 2004; Blakemore et al., 2005). But if body 
representations are shared, then it seems that their activation cannot suffice to 
GLVFULPLQDWH EHWZHHQ RQH¶V ERG\ DQG RWKHU SHRSOH¶V ERGLHV 'Res one then need a 
³:KRVH´ V\VWHP WR UHFRJQL]H RQH¶V ERG\ DV RQH¶V RZQ LQ WKH VDPH ZD\ WKDW
Jeannerod argued that one needs D³:KR´V\VWHPWRUHFRJQL]HRQH¶VDFWLRQVDVRQH¶V
own?  
 
Keywords: self, bodily ownership, agency, naked intention, mirroring, imitation, 
interpersonal body representation, peripersonal space, mirror-tactile synaesthesia, 
vicarious touch, empathy, pain, embodiment 
*Manuscript
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1. Introduction 
A recent trend in the neuroscientific and philosophical literature suggests that we 
have representations that are shared between self and others (Gallese, 2001; Goldman, 
2006). It all started in 1992 when researchers in Parma found that the same neurons 
fired both when a monkey was grasping a peanut and when it was watching the 
experimenter grasping it (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti et al., 1995; Grezes & 
Decety, 2001). More generally, the motor system is activated not only when an agent 
executes a goal-directed action, but also when an observer perceives the same action 
performed by another agent. What makes action mirroring special is that it goes 
beyond mere conceptual sharing. In Jeannerod (1994)¶V WHUPV RQH GRHV QRt share 
RQO\ VHPDQWLF NQRZOHGJH DERXW WKH DFWLRQ RQH VKDUHV WKH DJHQW¶V SUDJPDWLF
perspective. As such, action mirroring allows the observer to internalize another 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V actions as if she were the agent by a kind of motor simulation.  
Most people have drawn the implications of those shared action representations for 
3rd person mindreading (do they allow direct understanding RI RWKHU SHRSOH¶V
intentions?). By contrast, Marc Jeannerod focuses his interest on their implications for 
self-awareness and more specifically, for the sense of agency (how do I recognize my 
actions as my own?). With Elisabeth Pacherie, he argues that shared motor 
representations consist in what they call naked intentions, that is, intentions that are 
neutral relative to the agent (Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004). The naked content can 
take two forms: either impersonal of the type <action, goal> or personal of the type 
<x, action, goal>, with x as the parameter of the agent still to be determined (de 
Vignemont, 2004; Jeannerod and Pacherie, 2004). In any case, the activation of 
shared motor representations cannot suffice to differentiate whether it is the agent 
moving or another person moving. Further processes based on extra information are 
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 4 
needed: ³*LYHQWKHH[LVWHQFHRIVKDUHGUHSresentations, something more than the sole 
DZDUHQHVV RI D QDNHG LQWHQWLRQ LV QHHGHG WR GHWHUPLQH LWV DXWKRU´ -HDQQHURG DQG
Pacherie, 2004, p. 140). The lack of differentiation between self and others seems 
indeed to indicate that one needs a specific mecKDQLVPWRWDNHDSDUWRQH¶VDFWLRQVDQG
RWKHU SHRSOH¶V DFWLRQV *HRUJLHII DQG -HDQQHURG  FDOO WKLV PHFKDQLVP WKH
³:KR´V\VWHP 
Jeannerod analyses mirroring exclusively in motor terms, with no reference to the 
body that carries the action. However, it seems that in some situations, we need to 
establish a correspondence between the representation of our body and the 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI RWKHU SHRSOH¶V ERGLHV +RZ GR ZH DFKLHYH VXFK FRUUHVSRQGHQFH"
Are there shared body representations? These questions are all the more legitimate 
since recent evidence indicates the existence of shared cortical networks for bodily 
sensations. Brain activity partially overlaps when one experiences touch or pain and 
when one observes another individual receiving a tactile or a painful stimulus (e.g., 
Singer et al., 2004; Keysers et al., 2004). Strikingly, people with mirror-tactile 
synaesthesia even consciously feel tactile sensations on their face upon perceiving 
another person touched on the face (Blakemore et al., 2005). Like for action, shared 
cortical networks for bodily sensations have been systematically considered from the 
perspective of the understanding of other people, and especially in relation to empathy 
(Goldman, 2011; Banissy and Ward, 2007; Keysers et al., 2010; Ebish et al., 2009, 
Wood et al., 2010). But what consequences do they have for the sense of bodily 
ownership? All together, these findings may be taken as evidence of shared body 
representations. But if body representations are shared, then it seems that their 
DFWLYDWLRQ FDQQRW VXIILFH WR GLVFULPLQDWH EHWZHHQ RQH¶V ERG\ DQG RWKHU SHRSOH¶V
ERGLHV 6KRXOG ZH WKHQ H[WHQG -HDQQHURG¶V FRQFOXVLRQ WR WKH sense of bodily 
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 5 
ownership",QRWKHUZRUGVGRZHQHHGD³:KRVH´V\VWHP to recognize our body as 
our own?  
 
2. An embodied approach to the correspondence problem 
A classic problem in the imitation literature is known as the intersubjective 
correspondence problem: how does one map DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V PRYHPHQWV WR RQH¶V
own movements (Goldenberg, 1995; Heyes, 2001)? The classic way to approach the 
correspondence problem has been in sensorimotor terms: how does one map visual 
information to motor command (e.g., Brass and Heyes, 2005)? Alternatively, one can 
consider that the main challenge is a problem of intermodal correspondence: how 
does one map visual information to somatosensory information (e.g., Meltzoff and 
Moore, 1995)? This latter problem can be found not only in imitation (and especially 
in the case of opaque movements like tongue protrusion for which one has no visual 
feedback), but also in vicarious bodily sensations experienced when observing other 
people receiving tactile (or painful) stimulation. However, the question that interests 
us here is whether there is a further approach to the correspondence problem. In other 
words, is there a bodily correspondence problem? In imitation, one maps the 
movement of another body onWRRQH¶VERG\ DQG LQPLUURU-tactile synaesthesia, one 
maps the location of touch on another bod\ WR RQH¶V RZQ ERG\ )RU DOO WKDW LV
intersubjective correspondence mediated by bodily correspondence? Shared motor, 
affective and somatosensory representations have recently been taken as evidence in 
favour of embodied social cognition (Gallese, 2007; Gallagher, 2005). However, the 
sense in which those states are embodied remains often obscure. We shall see now 
that they are two distinct types of shared representations, and only one of them 
involves body representations.  
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2.1 Disembodied shared representations  
According to a narrow interpretation of the notion of embodiment, shared 
representations qualify as embodied in virtue of their bodily content (Goldman and 
Vignemont, 2009). They carry information about the body, and in particular about its 
spatial properties. In this sense, embodied representations are representations of the 
body. But there is another interpretation of the notion of embodiment, according to 
which shared representations qualify as embodied in virtue of their specific bodily 
format (Goldman and de Vignemont, 2009; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011). Bodily 
format is a class of representational code, which includes somatosensory, 
interoceptive, affective, and motor codes. It is then one thing to be endowed with a 
bodily format and it is another thing to have a bodily spatial content. For example, the 
YLVXDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIRQH¶VKDQGKDVDVSDWLDOERGLO\FRQWHQWEXWLWLVQRWHQFRGHG
in a bodily format. Conversely, affective states are endowed with a bodily format 
(because they are associated to - or caused by - certain physiological bodily states), 
but they do not have a spatial bodily content. 
Let us now apply this distinction between content and format to social cognition. 
With Alvin Goldman, we argued that shared representations ± motor, somatosensory 
and affective ± are endowed with a bodily format. In this sense, they are embodied. 
For all that they do not necessarily represent the properties of the body, and in 
particular its spatial properties. In this narrower sense, they are not embodied. In other 
words, the existence of shared representations in bodily format does not necessarily 
imply the existence of shared body representations. Here I will focus exclusively on 
the notion of bodily content. The question then is whether action mirroring, vicarious 
pain and vicarious touch are embodied or disembodied in the narrow sense.  
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Let us consider first the case of action mirroring. It is useful here to draw the 
parallel with the distinction between imitation and emulation. Emulation involves the 
copy of the goal of a perceived action. For instance, upon seeing someone taking an 
umbrella, one takes an umbrella as well, but the bodily movement can be completely 
different. In contrast, in imitation not only is the goal copied, but also the bodily 
movements used to reach the goal. For instance, upon seeing someone taking an 
umbrella by lifting it with the foot, one performs the same movement instead of 
simply grasping it with the hand. The difference between imitation and emulation is 
thus a matter of motor hierarchy: at what level the visually perceived action is 
analysed and copied. The low level is strongly embodied (imitation), whereas the 
more abstract levels are weakly embodied (emulation). The question then is at what 
level action mirroring occurs. To what extent are bodily parameters represented in 
mirror systems? Does one use body representations to covertly replicate actions that 
one perceives?  
A series of brain imaging studies show that mirroring is closer to emulation than 
imitation insofar as it encodes the motor goal instead of the specific bodily movement 
to achieve the goal (Csibra, 2007). On the one hand, the same bodily movement 
performed for two distinct intentions (grasping a mug for drinking or for cleaning for 
instance, cf. Iacoboni et al., 2005) activates two distinct brain areas. On the other 
hand, different bodily movements performed for the same intention (grasping with the 
mouth and grasping with the hand, cf. Gallese et al., 1996; grasping fooGZLWKRQH¶V
hand and with a stick, cf. Ferrari et al., 2005) activate the same brain area. 
Interestingly, Csibra (2007) notes that the majority of mirror neurons are only broadly 
congruent. What is shared is not the representation of the specific limb to move, but 
rather some motor representation higher in the motor hierarchy. Intersubjective 
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 8 
correspondence is then achieved exclusively in motor terms, and not in bodily terms. 
These findings show how weakly embodied (in the content sense, not in the format 
sense) the mirror systems can be. 
The question of bodily correspondence may then seem more legitimate in the case 
of vicarious bodily sensations than in the case of action mirroring. At first sight, one 
may expect the involvement of body representation more systematic, or even 
necessary, in vicarious pain and in vicarious touch insofar they are vicarious versions 
of bodily sensations. Yet, this is not the case, as we shall see now.  
Let us consider the case of pain first. The pain matrix includes two functionally 
specialized networks. The sensory-discriminative component involves the experience 
of the intensity of pain and its bodily location. It recruits primary and secondary 
somatosensory areas (SI and SII) as well as the posterior insula. Since SI has a 
somatotopic organization, different regions of SI are activated according to whether 
RQH H[SHULHQFHV VWDQGDUG SDLQ LQ RQH¶V KDQG LQ RQH¶V IRRW RU LQ RQH¶V PRXWK ,Q
addition, the sensory-discriminative component has a motor counterpart: its activity 
underlies specific automatic localized motor responses whose function is to avoid (or 
decrease) the pain. For instance, the muscles adjacent to the location of the painful 
stimulus freeze, so to speak. The affective component involves the experience of the 
unpleasantness of the painful experience. It recruits the anterior insula, the anterior 
cingulated cortex, the thalamus, and the brain stem. It lacks somatotopic organization. 
Now if one experiences vicarious pain, then what happens? Are both components 
active? More particularly, is vicarious pain localized LQ D SDUW RI RQH¶V ERG\ WKDW
matches the body part that is seen injured? Interestingly, when participants observe 
cues indicating that another individual is receiving a painful stimulus, most brain 
imaging studies report a selective activation of the affective component only, with no 
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 9 
associated activation of SI (e.g., Singer et al., 2004). For instance, the same brain 
activation was found whether the hand or the foot was injured (Jackson et al., 2005). 
Vicarious affective pain is thus indifferent to the bodily location of pain. This is why 
RQH FDQ YLFDULRXVO\ H[SHULHQFH SDLQ XSRQ HLWKHU SHUFHLYLQJ DQRWKHU¶V IDFLDO
H[SUHVVLRQZKLFKGRHVQRWUHYHDOWKHERGLO\ORFDWLRQRIWKHRWKHU¶VSDLQ%RWYLQLFNHW
al.,  RU LPDJLQLQJ DQRWKHU¶V QRQ-located painful experience (Jackson et al., 
2006). One may conceive vicarious affective pain as a vicarious version of a non-
ORFDOL]HGERGLO\IHHOLQJRIWKHW\SH³,WKXUWV´de Vignemont and Jacob, 2012). In this 
sense, it is disembodied.  
One may expect vicarious tactile sensations to be more strongly embodied, since 
they are generally devoid of affectivity. Yet, this is far from being so. Touch is also 
characterized by its dual nature, although of a different kind from pain. Touch can be 
active (touchant) or passive (touché), or both at the same time in self-touch. One can 
then distinguish between vicarious touchant experience and vicarious touché 
experience, although they are confounded in most experiments. Several brain imaging 
studies found activity only in SII, and not in SI, when participants observed another 
person being touched (Keysers et al., 2004; Ebisch et al., 2008). Interestingly, SII was 
activated even when participants watched an object being touched, rolls of paper for 
instance. It thus seems that most of the time vicarious touch takes into account 
primarily the body part that is touching (vicarious touchant experience): ³:KDW LV
being touched does not PDWWHUDVORQJDVWRXFKRFFXUV´ (Keysers et al., 2004, p. 339). 
According to Keyser and coll. (2010), vicarious touch corresponds to the mirroring of 
tactile consequences of action. 
To conclude, there is evidence of shared action, shared touch and shared pain, but 
so far there is no evidence of shared body representations. The intersubjective 
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correspondence problem is not necessarily encoded in bodily terms. One can map the 
other onto oneself while bracketting the spatial properties of the body. Shared 
representations are then disembodied insofar as they do not have a bodily spatial 
content. Yet, as we shall see now, it can be useful, or even necessary in some 
VLWXDWLRQV WRDQDO\VHRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPRYHPHQWVDQGVHQVDWLRQVLQ WHUPVRIWKHERG\
parts that move and that are stimulated. 
 
2.2 Embodied shared representations in imitation 
³%RG\ SDUW FRGLQJ UHGXFHV WKH YLVXDO DSSHDUDQFH RI WKH GHPRQVWUDWHG
gestures to simple spatial relationships between a limited set of discrete 
body parts. Body part coding facilitates imitation because it produces 
equivalence between demonstration and imitation that is independent of 
WKH GLIIHUHQW PRGDOLWLHV DQG SHUVSHFWLYHV RI SHUFHLYLQJ RQH¶V RZQ DQG
RWKHU SHUVRQV¶ ERGLHV DQG EHFDXVH LW UHGXFHV WKH ORDG RQ ZRUNLQJ
memory in which the shape of the gesture must be held until motor 
executiRQLVFRPSOHWHG´*ROGHQEHUJS 
Goldenberg (2009) defends an embodied approach to imitation, according to which 
RQHXVHVNQRZOHGJHDERXWWKHERG\WRGHFRGHWKHRWKHU¶VPRYHPHQWDQGFRS\LW7KH
special role of body representation in imitation is especially salient for some specific 
types of actions. This is the case for instance when one imitates meaningless gestures. 
Upon seeing a military salute, one can recognize it as such and use a stored motor 
schema of the salute to replicate it. But when one sees a person putting her thumb 
above her eyebrow, the only solution is to encode the movement in terms of the body 
parts that are seen and their spatial relations. Hence, it is classically assumed that 
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there are two routes for imitation: one that involves the recognition of the seen action 
and the other that does notDQGRQO\WKHODWWHUXVHVµERG\SDUWFRGLQJ¶IRUUHYLHZVHH
Rumiati et al., 2009). Deficits in imitation are then sometimes explained in terms of 
deficits of body representation. This is the case for instance in patients with ideomotor 
apraxia who are most affected in the imitation of meaningless gestures (Goldenberg, 
1995; Buxbaum et al., 2000; Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005).  
Imitation is often considered as the key mechanism for acquisition of new skills. 
But the use of imitation is not restricted to explicit learning context. Rather, we have a 
SHUPDQHQW WHQGHQF\ WR DXWRPDWLFDOO\ LPLWDWH RWKHU SHRSOH¶V PRYHPHQWV ZKLFK ZH
need to inhibit (Brass et al., 2001). This can be shown if subjects simultaneously 
perform a movement. For example, participants are faster in moving their index finger 
when observing an index finger movement than a middle finger movement. Motor 
facilitation effect is driven by the bodily congruency between the effectors and cannot 
be reduced to a mere spatial congruency effect. For instance, Brass and coll. (2001) 
asked participants to observe an index finger tapping and lifting, but the image was 
inverted (upward motion for tapping and downward motion for lifting). Yet, 
participants were faster in tapping when observing tapping in spite of the fact that 
tapping responses (downward motion) were spatially incompatible with tapping 
stimuli (upward motion) and were spatially compatible with lifting stimuli (downward 
motion). This study is only one among many other experiments that indicate that how 
parts of the body are located and move relative to one another is mirrored when 
REVHUYLQJ RWKHU SHRSOH¶V DFWLRQV HJ *LOOPHLVWHU HW DO  ,nterestingly, it was 
found that the mere observation of coloured patches on DQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶V static body 
parts (head, hand or foot) sufficed to prime action with the same body parts (Bach et 
al.,  7KH DXWKRUV FRQFOXGHG LQ IDYRXU RI D ³ERG\ VFKHPD WKDt represents 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 12 
ORFDWLRQVRQWKHREVHUYHU¶VERG\DQGRQWKHERGLHVRIRWKHUVLQDFRPPRQIRUPDW´S
515). Hence, in some cases, what is shared is not only the representation of the goal or 
the movement, but the representation of the effector itself that performs the 
movement. This is confirmed at the neural level. For example, observation of hand, 
foot and mouth actions selectively activates distinct regions of human ventral 
premotor and parietal cortex (Buccino et al., 2001). Importantly, Wheaton et al. 
(2004) showed this somatotopic pattern of activation even when movements were 
held constant across effectors (opening and closing movements of a hand and a 
mouth, respectively). Hence, correspondence between self and others can be encoded 
in bodily terms in some situations.  
There are several versions of the bodily approach to imitation. For example, 
Goldenberg (1995) argues that imitation recruits abstract conceptual knowledge of the 
human body. By contrast, Chaminade and coll. (2005) as well as Buxbaum and coll. 
(2000) consider the primitive body schema as the most likely candidate in virtue of its 
sensorimotor content. Finally, the body image is sometimes also mentioned in virtue 
of its visuo-spatial content (Gallagher and Meltzoff, 1996). Given the confusion 
around these various notions (de Vignemont, 2010), I shall leave them aside and 
instead specify what bodily information needs to be encoded in imitation. A first point 
is that it must be quite rough-grained. There are many differences between bodies. 
The body whose movements I copy is never identical to my body: not only is our 
posture rarely the same, but our gender can also be different, as well as the size of our 
limbs, the strength of our muscles, the flexibility of our joints, and so forth. Yet this 
does not prevent intersubjective correspondence. Typically a child can imitate an 
adult. The brain must thus abstract from major bodily differences. It then seems that 
what remains in common between all bodies is the configuration of the various body 
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parts, i.e. the fact that we have two hands and two feet and they are respectively 
located at the end of our arms and legs. More precisely, what needs to be represented 
is the functional arrangement of bodily effectors. It was indeed found that the 
movements that are seen are perceived in terms of functional units of effectors that 
move together. Functional body parts consist in parts of the body that are regrouped 
by their role in action. Fingers and hands can constitute grasping units for instance. 
The foot and the leg can constitute kicking units or walking units. The fact that it is 
visually shaped like a hand or like a foot and a leg does not matter. For example, 
observing hand, foot or mouth actions selectively activate brain areas for hand, foot, 
and mouth even if the movement is performed by non-conspecifics such as monkeys 
or dogs (Buccino et al., 2004), or robots (Gazzola et al., 2007a; Press et al., 2005). 
What matters to mirroring is mouth-action, not whether the mouth that is moving is 
yours or your doJ¶V The visual appearance and exact shape of the perceived body 
part are of little importance. What matters is the type of movements it can afford. This 
is well illustrated by the following finding in aplasic individuals who were born 
without hands and who perform with their feet and their mouth actions normally 
performed with hands. It was found that they activated regions of the mirror system 
recruited in mouth and foot movement execution when observing hand movements 
(Gazzola et al., 2007b). In mirroring, one matches functional bodily units dedicated to 
specific types of movements (grasping for instance), no matter whether those 
functional bodily units are instantiated by a hand or a mouth. Arguably, this level of 
segmentation of the body into parts is the most relevant for action in general, and for 
imitation and mirroring in particular. For most gestures one can dispense with more 
detailed bodily specification. All that needs to be represented is the dynamic position 
of functionally defined body parts with respect to one another (Buxbaum et al., 2000).  
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2.3 Embodied shared representation in vicarious sensations 
Intersubjective correspondence recruits body representations not only in imitation, 
but also for some vicarious bodily sensations. Vicarious pain can be of two distinct 
kinds. It includes not only vicarious affective pain, which is disembodied, but also 
vicarious sensory pain, which is embodied (de Vignemont and Jacob, 2012). For 
instance, it was found activation of the somatopically organized SI upon seeing the 
EDFN RI DQRWKHU¶V KDQG EHLQJ GHHSO\ SHQHWUDWHG E\ D QHHGOH %XIDODUL HW DO 
Motor responses to vicarious sensory pain are even muscle-specific, similar to those 
IRXQG ZKHQ RQH LV LQMXUHG ZKHQ RQH VHHV DQRWKHU¶V KDQG EHLQJ KXUW RQH 
DXWRPDWLFDOO\IUHH]HVRQH¶VRZQKDQGDVLIRQH¶VRZQKDQGZHUHLQMXUHG$YHQDQWLHW
al., 2005; 2009). These experimental results strongly suggest that in experiencing 
YLFDULRXV VHQVRU\ SDLQ RQH UHVSRQGV WR WKH SHUFHSWLRQ RI DQRWKHU¶V ERGLO\ SDUW
subjected to painful stimulation by expecting specific sensorimotor consequences of 
pain at the same location RQRQH¶VRZQERG\ 
Likewise individuals with mirror-touch synaesthesia consciously feel tactile 
sensations on their own body when they see another persoQ¶V EHLQJ WRXFKHG
(Blakemore et al., 2005; Banissy and Ward, 2007). Upon seeing another being 
touched on the left cheek for example, they experience a sensation of touch on their 
own cheek. If at the same time they are touched on the right cheek, they either report 
feeling touch on both sides or they make mistakes (they report feeling touch on the 
left). This is not a mere attentional effect. They do not make mistakes if they see a 
visual flash on the left of the face rather than receive a tactile stimulus (Banissy and 
Ward, 2007). When compared to normal subjects, it was found a more intense activity 
of the somatosensory cortex when subjects with mirror-tactile synaesthesia saw 
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people being touched (Blakemore et al., 2005). In addition to individuals with mirror-
tactile synaesthesia, it was found that some patients with phantom limbs reported 
IHHOLQJ WDFWLOH VHQVDWLRQV RQ WKHLU SKDQWRP KDQG ZKHQ REVHUYLQJ DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V
hand being touched (Ramachandran and Brang, 2009).  
The interpersonal dimension of body representations in the sensory domain is 
confirmed by results both in the multisensory literature and in the neuropsychological 
literature. It is well known that viewing the body part that is touched (without viewing 
the touching object) enhances tactile DFXLW\ VR WKDW RQH¶V MXGJHPHQWV DERXW WDFWLOH
sensations are both faster (Tipper et al., 1998) and more accurate (Kennett et al., 
2001). Importantly, the effect of visual enhancement of touch is as effective when 
VHHLQJ RQH¶V RZQ ERG\ SDUW DV ZKHQ VHHLQJ DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V ERG\ SDUW +DJJDUG
2006). Likewise, Thomas and coll. (2006) found that participants were faster in 
detecting touch when they saw before a non-SUHGLFWLYHYLVXDOFXHRQDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶V
body at the corresponding location. The authors concluded:  ³:H EHOLHYH WKDW RXU
results provide the first behavioural evidence in normal subjects for interpersonal 
ERG\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQEDVHGRQDVRPDWRWRSLFVSDWLDOPDSDWWKHSXUHO\VHQVRU\OHYHO´
(Thomas et al., 2006, p. 328). Findings in neuropsychology also indicate the existence 
RIDVLPLODUERG\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQIRUSHUFHSWLRQWKDWLVµLQWHUSHUVRQDO¶0RVW± but not 
all ± patients with autotopagnosia fail to locate body parts not only on their own body, 
EXWDOVRRQRWKHUSHRSOH¶VERGLHV, on mannequins and on drawings of a human body.  
Hence, one exploits body representations in order to map the location of the tactile 
RUSDLQIXOVWLPXODWLRQRIDQRWKHU¶VERG\RQWRRQH¶VRZQERG\One can speculate that 
like in action, bodily coding in vicarious sensations must go beyond the differences 
between bodies and carry information only about the configuration of the body. But 
the spatial organization of the body is not similarly represented in imitation and in 
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vicarious bodily sensations. Whereas the representation of the body that is used in 
imitation represents functionally defined body parts, the representation of the body 
that is used in vicarious bodily sensations represents anatomically defined body part. 
One may for instance note that the disruption of the representation of the 
configuration of the body in patients with autotopagnosia does not affect their actions. 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence on the spatial organization of body 
representation in the case of vicarious bodily sensations. The distinction between a 
functional and an anatomical representation of the body, however, is in line with a 
classic distinction between two types of body representation, one oriented towards 
action and the other towards body perception (Dijkerman & de Haan, 2007; 
Gallagher, 2005; Head & Holmes, 1911; Paillard, 1980; de Vignemont, 2010). The 
two types of body representation follow distinct principles of spatial organization (de 
Vignemont et al., 2005; de Vignemont et al., 2009; Tsakiris et al., 2006; Hach et al., 
2011). In particular, action requires a more unified map of the body than perception: 
when I move my forearm, my hand and fingers follow. By contrast, if someone 
touches my forearm, this usually does not tell me anything about the sensation in my 
hand and fingers. On the basis of the results described above, it seems that both types 
of body representation can be recruited in social context.  
 
2.3 Embodied shared representations of peripersonal space 
There is a last series of evidence that argue in favour of shared body 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV:HNQRZWKDWWKHVSDFHLPPHGLDWHO\VXUURXQGLQJRQH¶VERG\QDPHO\
peripersonal space, is processed differently than extrapersonal space (for review, 
Brozzoli et al., 2012). A large number of studies with monkeys have now found 
bimodal neurons in several brain structures (putamen, parietal and premotor area), 
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which are activated both by touch and by vision (or audition). Interestingly, they are 
activated even when the visual stimulus is not on the body part itself, but up to 30-
50cm off the body part (e.g., Cooke and Graziano, 2003). Moreover, the visual (or 
auditory) activity follows the position of the tactile receptive field associated to a 
specific part of the body when the part is moved. It is thus body-centered. Several 
studies support the existence of a similar multimodal representation of peripersonal 
space in humans, which results in the interaction between visual (or auditory) 
stimulus near the body and tactile processing. The best known evidence in favour of 
such multimodal interaction is the cross-modal congruency effect. Participants are 
asked to report when they feel a vibrotactile stimulation and to judge its location. It 
was shown that neutral visual stimuli interfere with tactile detection and tactile 
localization, if the location of the visual stimuli is incongruent with the location of the 
tactile stimuli (Spence et al., 2004). This effect works only if the visual stimuli are 
close to a part of the body. For such interference to happen, both visual and tactile 
experiences must share a common spatial frame of reference. It is not the visual frame 
because the interference is not sensitive to bodily posture. If the flash of light is close 
to your left hand and the touch is applied to your right hand, your performance 
decreases even if your hands are crossed. Hence, even if the flash is visually located 
close to the hand that is touched, they are not perceived as being congruent. As 
Graziano and Gross (1993, p. 107) described it, the peripersonal space is like ³D
gelatinous medium surrounding the body that deforms whenever the head rotates or 
the limbs move´.  
Objects in peripersonal space are endowed with a special significance for the body. 
They may be perceived as potential threats or obstacles. The function of information 
processing in peripersonal space is not uniquely to avoid snakes, and other life-risking 
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VLWXDWLRQV2QHQHHGVWRSURWHFWRQH¶VERG\LQHYHU\GD\OLIHDVZHOOas when one walks 
through a room without hitting the furniture, one brushes away an insect, one reaches 
safely around a prickly object, or one sits at a desk without bruising oQH¶V elbows and 
arms as one works. Objects in peripersonal space may also be perceived as potential 
targets for action. One may question whether there is a single peripersonal space or two, 
one defined as margin of safety and the other defined as reaching space, but I shall leave 
this question aside and focus instead RQWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIRWKHUSHRSOH¶VSHULSHUVRQDO
space. A series of evidence indeed indicates that it recruits the same resource as the 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIRQH¶VSHULSHUVRQDOVSDFH 
Ishida and coll. (2010) found in monkey parietal areas that some visuo-tactile 
QHXURQVILUHGZKHQDYLVXDOVWLPXOXVZDVFORVHERWKWRDSDUWRIWKHPRQNH\¶VERG\
DQG WR WKH H[SHULPHQWHU¶V HTXLYDOHQW ERG\ SDUW 7KH HIIHFW ZDV ERG\ SDUW VSHFLILF
Likewise in humans, it was found that SI was activated when the experimenter 
stroked with a paintbrush the region of space close to a hand visually presented from a 
third-person perspective (Schaefer et al., 2012). Surprisingly, however, the activity 
was stronger than when the experimenter stroked the peripersonal space of a hand 
visually presented from a first-person perspective. In addition, it was shown that one 
UHSUHVHQWV RWKHU SHRSOH¶V UHDFKLQJ VSDFH LQ WKH VDPH ZD\ as RQH UHSUHVHQWV RQH¶V
reaching space. For example, it is known that the motor system is activated by the 
mere vision of a graspable object. Furthermore, it has been shown that the spatial 
alignment of the object with the effector affects the motor response. For example, if 
the handle of a mug is aligned with the left hand, one is quicker if using the left hand 
than the left hand to grasp it. This effect works, however, only if the mug is in the 
DJHQW¶VUHDFKLQJVSDFH (Costantini et al., 2010). Now a recent study showed that the 
effect worked as well if the mug was in DYLUWXDOLQGLYLGXDO¶V reaching space, although 
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LWZDVQRWLQWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶own reaching space. There was no effect, on the other 
hand, if the mug was close to a cylinder of the same size as the virtual avatar. Neither 
was there any effect if there was a near-transparent panel between the avatar and the 
mug (Costantini et al., 2011). Cardellicchio and coll. (2012) further showed that 
motor-evoked potentials were higher when the mug was close either to the 
participants or to the avatar. The auWKRUV FRQFOXGHG ³Our proposal is that such 
sensitivity can be explained by means of an interpersonal bodily space representation 
allowing one to map the body of other people in terms of their actual motor 
possibilities.´S 
To conclude, there are several ways to solve the intersubjective correspondence 
problem. In the domain of mirroring, it can involve representations of the motor goal. 
In the domain of vicarious bodily sensations, it can involve affective representations. 
Those representations qualify as embodied insofar their mental format is concerned. 
But they do not qualify as embodied in a narrower sense: they do not represent bodily 
states. Yet, there are cases in which the correspondence problem is solved thanks to 
representations of the body. Some cases of imitation as well as some vicarious bodily 
sensations respect bodily congruency. In order to do so, they need to exploit a 
representation of the body to map RWKHUSHRSOH¶VERGLHVWRRQH¶VRZQERG\. The body 
is then the common ³FXUUHQF\´ EHWZHHQ VHOI DQG RWKHUV And this is so both in the 
motor and in the perceptual domains.  
But what consequences does it have for the sense of bodily ownership? Jeannerod 
DQG3DFKHULH¶VDUJXPHQWIRUWKHVHQVHRIDJHQF\FDQEHDUWLFXODWHGLQWRIRXr steps: (i) 
there are representations shared between self and others; (ii) thus, they must be 
endowed with a naked content (neutral relative to the agent); (iii) thus, they can lead 
WRFRQIXVLRQEHWZHHQVHOIDQGRWKHUVLYWKXVRQHQHHGVD³:KR´V\VWHP. We shall 
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now ask whether this argument can apply to the sense of bodily ownership and 
whether the evidence reviewed so far raises a challenge for theories of bodily 
ownership, in the same way that the existence of shared action representations raises a 
challenge for theories of agency. I will now consider two ways to escape Jeannerod 
DQG 3DFKHULH¶V DUJXPHQW )LUVW RQH PD\ REMHFW WR WKH YHU\ ILUVW VWHS WKHUH DUH QR
representations shared between self and others, but only a coupling of self-specific 
and non self-specific representations. Second, one may object to the transition from 
the second step to the third step: naked content does not necessarily open the door to 
confusion.  
 
3. A matter of coupling?  
Intersubjective correspondence can be encoded in bodily terms. So far I have 
assumed that it involves shared body representation, that is, a single representation 
exploited for bRWK RQH¶V ERG\ DQG RWKHU ERGLHV. There is, however, an alternative 
model that can account for the evidence reviewed above. Intersubjective 
correspondence can also be achieved by the automatic association of distinct 
representations. This latter view has been defended among others by Celia Heyes 
(2001). According to the Associative Sequence Learning (ASL) model, imitation is 
based on past experiences of the systematic coupling between the action one performs 
and its sensory consequences. Typically, when I wave my hand, I see it waving. I can 
thus learn the sensorimotor association so that when I see another person waving, the 
sensory input can automatically elicit the associated motor output. Another example 
can be found in Gallagher and Meltzoff (1993). They argue that imitation depends on 
the systematic association between the body schema, which is primarily 
proprioceptive and motor, and the body image, which is primarily visual. One can 
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also interpret some of the multisensory results along these lines. On the basis of their 
findings that the vision of non-SUHGLFWLYH FXHV RI DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V ERG\ FRXOG
interfere with tactile SURFHVVLQJRQRQH¶VRZQERG\7KRPDVDQGFROOGHILQHG
VKDUHG ERG\ UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV LQ WHUPV RI ³D VSHFLDO DXWRPDWLF PHFKDQLVP IRU
DVVRFLDWLQJVHQVRU\ERG\HYHQWV´S 
These different conceptions do not directly address the question of the specific 
content of the representations that are associated. In particular, are those 
representations naked? Are they neutral relative to the owner of the body? Let us 
consider in more detail the ASL model. The two terms of the association are (i) a 
motor representation, which consists in the activity of the mirror system at the neural 
level, and (ii) a visual representation of the movement. The visual representation can 
UHSUHVHQWHLWKHURQH¶VRZQPRYHPHQWRUDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VPRYHPHQW,QWKLVVHQVHLW
can be said to be naked. The seen movement is unattributed. The motor 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRQWKHRWKHUKDQGLVDOZD\VXVHGIRURQH¶VRZQPRWRUV\VWHP,WSOD\V
DUROHIRURQH¶VRZQDFWLRQVDQGRQH¶VRZQDFWLRQVRQO\+HQFHRQHPD\DUJXHWKDW
it is first-personal (although not necessarily reflexively). The association can thus be 
reformulated as follows: an intention <I raise my finger> associated to a visual 
representation <a finger raising>. The association was built on the basis of past 
experiences of seeing my finger raising when I have the intention to raise my finger. 
But it has generalized to any raising finger. Hence, when I see you raising your finger, 
this activates my mirror system and I have an automatic tendency to imitate the 
movement. On this view, the motor representation LV DFWLYDWHG E\ DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V
actions, but for all that it does not represent intentions RWKHUWKDQRQH¶VRZQ2QO\WKH
visual representation has a naked content, not the motor representation. We can apply 
the same analysis to mirror-tactile synaesthesia. Then the association is between a 
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tactile representation <touch on my cheek> and a visual representation <tactile stimuli 
on a cheek>. Again, only the visual representation has a naked content, even if the 
tactile representation is activated by another person being touched.  
If this is the right interpretation, then it is PLVOHDGLQJ WR WDON RI µVKDUHG
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ 7KH UHVXOWV GHVFULEHG LQ WKH ILUVW VHFWLRQ DUH PHUHO\ D PDWWHU RI
coupling, rather than sharing. They have no implication for the content of the motor 
and the somatosensory representations. All they imply is that visual representations 
have a naked content, but this is hardly surprising. 'LVFULPLQDWLQJRQH¶VERG\ IURP
other bodies is then not an issue. As Gallagher and Meltzoff (1996, p. 225-226) noted, 
³Thus there is a coupling between self and other, and this coupling does not involve a 
confused experience´7KHERG\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDVVRFLDWHGWRWKHYLVXDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ
RI RWKHU SHRSOH¶V ERGLHV FDQ UHPDLQ VHOI-specific. One can thus dispense with a 
³:KRVH´ system. The possibility of bodily correspondence has no consequence for 
the sense of bodily ownership.  
+RZHYHU RQH PD\ FKDOOHQJH *DOODJKHU DQG 0HOW]RII¶V FRQFOXVLRQ FRXSOLQJ FDQ
lead to confusion if the coupling is mandatory. If the activation of one representation 
automatically and systematically induces the activation of the other, and vice-versa, 
then the coupled representations behave as if they constitute a unique representation.1 
It would be like marriage: after a while, you can never invite one spouse without the 
other; they have lost their individuality. More than coupling, one should then talk of 
fusion, which can lead to confusion. And if this is the case, then we are back to our 
original problem. If the FRXSOH LV DFWLYDWHG ERWK E\ VHHLQJ RQH¶V ERG\ DQG RWKHU
SHRSOH¶VERGLHVWKHQWKHDFWLYDWLRQRIWKHFRXSOHFDQQRORQJHUVXIILFHWRGLVFULPLQDWH
among bodies.  
                                                 
1
 I would like to thank Wolfgang Prinz for this objection.  
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The question is thus whether the coupling is mandatory or not. If it is, then it does 
not make much functional difference with actual sharing. To settle the debate, one 
must look at the empirical data. However, the evidence is not straightforward. On the 
one hand, some results indicate that the association can allow for some flexibility and 
plasticity. For example, it has been shown that automatic imitation is sensitive to 
sensorimotor learning (Cook et al., 2010). Body part priming in imitation was reduced 
following the repeated exposure to incongruent sensorimotor associations such as 
observing a hand action while performing a movement with the foot. On the other 
hand, other findings indicate a tight coupling, so tight that there are bidirectional 
relations between the two terms of the association.  
Most studies have investigated the effect of the observation of others upon oneself, 
but a few studies showed WKDW WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI RQH¶V ERG\ LQIOXHQFHV WKH
SHUFHSWLRQ RI RWKHU SHRSOH¶V ERGLHV For example, when participants observe two 
photographs that differ only in the position of one limb that alternates, they see an 
illusory movement of the limb. If the photographs are flashed in rapid succession, 
they perceive the limb traversing the shortest possible path of visual apparent motion, 
although it is biologically impossible because of joint constraints. But if the 
presentation rate slows down, they perceive paths of apparent limb movement that 
follow natural human limb trajectories (Shiffrar and Freyd, 1990). This result 
indicates that knowledge of RQH¶V joint constraints determines how one perceives 
RWKHUSHRSOH¶VERGLO\PRYHPHQWV. This effect is not driven by mere visual familiarity 
RIRWKHUSHRSOH¶VPRYHPHQWV, as shown by a study with two aplasic patients born with 
no arm (Funk et al., 2005). They shared the same visual familiarity of the movements 
that are biologically possible, but only one of the patients experienced phantom arms, 
and thus, had bodily familiarity with joint constraints. Interestingly, it was found that 
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only this patient showed the same perceptual pattern as normal subjects. Hence, the 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI RQH¶V ERGLO\ FRQVWUDLQWV FDQ DIIHFW WKH SHUFHSWLRQ RI DQRWKHU
LQGLYLGXDO¶VERGLO\PRYHPHQWV$QRWKHUVWXG\VKRZHGWKDWKHDOWK\SDUWLFLSDQWVZHUH
PRUHHIILFLHQWLQGHWHFWLQJFKDQJHVLQDPRGHO¶VOHJSRVWXUHWKDQLQWKHPRGHO¶VDUP
posture if they were moving their legs, and conversely that they were more efficient in 
GHWHFWLQJFKDQJHVLQDPRGHO¶VDUPSRVWXUHLIWKH\ZHUHPRYLQJWKHLUDUPV5HHGDQG
)DUDK  +HQFH QRW RQO\ GRHV WKH SHUFHSWLRQ RI DQRWKHU SHUVRQ¶V PRYHPHQW 
DIIHFW RQH¶V RZQ PRYHPHQWV RWKHU-to-VHOI EXW RQH¶V RZQ PRYHPHQWV FDQ DOVR
IDFLOLWDWHWKHSHUFHSWLRQRIDQRWKHU¶VERG\VHOI-to-other). These results do not offer a 
definite reply about the strength of the association, if association there is. Still they 
argue in favour of a strong coupling, or even of actual sharing. Let us now consider 
the implications of the hypothesis that body representations can be shared between 
self and others.  
 
4. A ³WKRVH´ system?  
If there are shared body representations, then the same representations are 
DFWLYDWHG ERWK IRU RQH¶V ERG\ DQG IRU RWKHU SHRSOH¶V ERGLHV. In order for body 
representations to fulfil their intersubjective function, they must thus represent what 
RQH¶V ERG\ DQG RWKHU ERGLHV KDYH LQ FRPPRQ DQG RQO\ WKDW In Jeannerod and 
3DFKHULH¶V terms, they must have a naked content. Their content is neutral relative to 
whose body it is. They leave the body unattributed DQGUHSUHVHQW LQGLIIHUHQWO\RQH¶V
ERG\DQGRWKHUSHRSOH¶VERGLHV. They can be either impersonal representations of the 
type <body part, bodily property> or personal representations with the owner x left 
unspecified of the type <x, body part, bodily property>. Thanks to their naked content 
WKH\ HQDEOH WKH SHUFHLYHU WR LPLWDWH DQRWKHU LQGLYLGXDO¶V DFWLRQV and to map her 
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sensations RQWR WKH SHUFHLYHU¶V ERG\. What can then be the content of naked body 
representations? On the basis of his findings on ideomotor apraxia, Goldenberg (1995, 
p.71) SURSRVHVWKHIROORZLQJFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQD³general concept of the human body 
which applies regardless of whether one's own body is concerned or not´. But if this 
is the right way to characterize shared body representations, then they can hardly 
ground the sense of bodily ownership. It then seems that one cannot dispense with a  
³:KRVH´ system.  
 
4.1 The Comparator models of ownership 
According to Jeannerod and Pacherie (2004, p. 139-140), the existence of shared 
DFWLRQ UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV LPSOLHV WKDW WKH\ FDQQRW JURXQG WKH VHQVH RI DJHQF\ ³If, 
however, we can be aware of both our intentions and those of others in the same way, 
QDPHO\DVXQDWWULEXWHGRUµQDNHG¶LQWHQWLRQVWKHSUREOHPRIVHOI-other discrimination 
GRHV LQGHHG DULVH « WKLV FRUWLFDO QHWZRUN SURYLGHV WKH EDVLV IRU WKH FRQVFLRXV
experience of goal-directedness² the primary awareness of intentions²but does not 
by itself provide us with a conscious experience of self- or other-DJHQF\´Likewise 
one may argue that because of their naked content, shared body representations 
FDQQRW VXIILFH WR GLVWLQJXLVK EHWZHHQ RQH¶V ERG\ DQG RWKHU SHRSOH¶V ERGLHV 7KH
impossibility lies in the fact that it cannot solve two opposite problems: the 
correspondence problem in intersubjective situations and the ownership problem. If at 
VRPH OHYHO WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIRQH¶VERG\ LV VLPLODU to the representation of other 
SHRSOH¶VERGLHVWKHQKRZFRXOGLWJURXQGWKHVHQVHRIRZQHUVKLS" It seems that the 
naked body representation would have to play two incompatible roles: grounding self-
awareness and grounding other-awareness. It thus follows from the existence of naked 
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ERG\UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVWKDWIXUWKHUSURFHVVHVDUHQHHGHGWRGLVFULPLQDWHEHWZHHQRQH¶V
ERG\DQGRWKHUSHRSOH¶VERGLHV%XWZKDWLVWKHH[DFWQDWXUHRIWKH³:KRVH´ system? 
In the recent philosophical and empirical literature, the prominent view is that the 
sense of agency should be understood as the result of the comparison between the 
SUHGLFWLRQ RI WKH VHQVRU\ FRQVHTXHQFHV RI RQH¶V DFWLRQV DQG WKHLU DFWXDO
consequences. Can one generalize the comparator model to the sense of body 
ownership? But then what are the different types of information to compare? In the 
case of the sense of agency, there is efferent information that can be compared to 
sensory information, but this is not true in the case of the sense of ownership. 
Arguably, RQHFDQ IHHORQH¶VERG\DVRQH¶VRZQDOWKRXJKRQH LVQRWPRYLQJ What 
type of information can help GLIIHUHQWLDWHRQH¶VERG\IURPRWKHUERGLHV"  
The dominant model of the ³:KRVH´ system is entirely drawn from the Rubber 
Hand Illusion (RHI) V\QFKURQRXV VWURNLQJ RI RQH¶V RZQ RFFOXGHG KDQG DQG DQ
anatomically congruent visible rubber hand leads to a sense of ownership over the 
rubber hand. On the basis of the RHI, it has been suggested that intermodal matching 
plays a key role for ownership (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998, Makin et al., 2008, but 
also Rochat 1IRUGHYHORSPHQWDOHYLGHQFH³It has been proposed that the body is 
distinguished from other objects as belonging to the self by its participation in specific 
forms of intermodal perceptual correlation´ (Botvinick and Cohen, 1998, p. 756). In 
support of this view, it was found that the ownership rating in questionnaires was 
correlated with the activity in brain regions that are classically involved in 
PXOWLVHQVRU\ SURFHVVHV ³the detection of correlated multisensory signals by these 
regions >premotor cortex and posterior parietal area@ is the mechanism for body 
ownership.´ (Ehrsson et al., 2005, p. 10571). 
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However, the hypothesis of intermodal matching leaves many questions 
unanswered. As pointed out by Botvinick and Cohen (1998), one still needs to 
GHWHUPLQH WKH ³VSHFLDO LQJUHGLHQW´ IRU RZQHUVKLS Indeed, the sense of body 
ownership cannot derive from any kind of intermodal correlation. Imagine that you 
see and hear two hands clapping. Despite visuo-auditory correlation, you do not feel 
these hands as your own. You also need the visuo-auditory information to correlate 
with proprioceptive and tactile information indicating that you, and nobody else, are 
clapping your hands. In other words, there must be information that is self-specific 
(e.g. somatosensory information) for intermodal correlation to play a role for 
ownership. Furthermore, there are some constraints that lay upon the RHI. For 
instance, visuo-somatosensory correlation fails to elicit an ownership illusion when 
the rubber hand is replaced by a wooden spoon (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005). Hence, 
Tsakiris (2010) argues in favour of a multi-layered ³:KRVH´ system that involves 
three distinct comparators: between the visual form of the viewed object and a pre-
existing body model, between the current state of the body and the postural and 
anatomical features of the body-SDUW WKDW LV WR EH H[SHULHQFHG DV RQH¶V RZQ DQG
between the vision of touch and the felt touch and their respective reference frames.  
However, although the RHI has been used as the experimental paradigm to 
investigate the sense of ownership, one can question whether the same type of 
mechanisms are at stake for the ownership of the rubber hand, which is merely seen, 
and for the ownership of a biological hand, which can be moved and experienced 
from the inside independently of any visual feedback. A recent lesion study showed 
dissociation between patients who failed to experience the RHI and patients who 
denied ownership of their own hand (Zeller et al., 2011). The authors concluded that 
the RHI recruits different brain regions than those involved for the sense of ownership 
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RIRQH¶VELRORJLFDOERG\One can also question whether there are alternative accounts 
of ownership that do not appeal to a ³:KRVH´ system despite the existence of shared 
body representations. I will now argue that the existence of naked body content does 
not necessarily lead to confusion between self and others. 
 
4.2 The Janus head hypothesis 
7KHGHEDWHKHUHLVIDUEURDGHUWKDQDERXWVRPHSXWDWLYH³:KRVH´V\VWHP:KDWLV
at stake is whether the exploitation of common resources prevents or reduces the 
modularity of the mind. According to the modular view, the brain is organized in 
specialized separately modifiable cognitive abilities that use specific, dedicated neural 
resources. A modularist may for example claim that some are dedicated to the self and 
others are dedicated to social cognition. However, more and more evidence indicates 
that brain regions are not recruited by a single task. Rather, they are recycled to 
support numerous cognitive functions (e.g., Anderson, 2010, Dehaene and Cohen, 
2007; Goldman, 2012). In other words, they are originally established for one purpose 
and reused for a different cognitive purpose. Recycling makes sense from an 
evolutionary perspective insofar as it is more parsimonious than developing new 
neural systems. But does it challenge the modular conception of the mind?  
The fact that there are modules does not preclude those modules from sharing parts 
wherever possible (Carruthers, 2006, p. 23)³As a result, what we should predict is 
that while there will be many modules, those modules should share parts wherever 
this can be achieved without losing too much processing efficiency´ This may work 
DORQJWKH³WLPH-VKDULQJPRGHO´RIIHUHGE\-XQJpDQG'HQQHWWS³$W
any given time, one high-OHYHO SURFHVVXVHV WKH ³ZRUNLQJV´RIPXOWLSOH ORZHU-level 
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areas, and (2) numerous high-level processes are hypothesized to alternately access a 
common pool of specialized lower-OHYHOUHVRXUFHV´The point is that modules are not 
exhausted by the parts that are shared. If the parts that are not shared are disrupted or 
modified, then it alters only one module and not the other. Likewise, shared body 
representations do not mean the end of the boundary between self and others. What is 
shared is the representation of the rough structure of the body, either for action or for 
perception. But this rough structure needs to be filled in for a full-fleshed spatial 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIRQH¶VERG\LQFOXGLQJLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWERG\PHWULFVIRUH[DPSOH
which is highly specific and can hardly be shared. Hence, some processing of bodily 
information constitutes a common resource between self and other people, which can 
in turn be used for one or the other. But what is shared, and thus naked, is only one 
component of more complex representations of the body that are not shared. Those 
PRUH FRPSOH[ ERG\ UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV PD\ EH FDOOHG ³VXSHUILFLDO VFKHPD´ +HDG DQG
+ROPHV³ERG\VWUXFWXUDOGHVFULSWLRQ´6FKZRHEHODQG&RVOHWWRU³ORQJ-
WHUPERG\LPDJH´2¶6KDXJKQHVV\All refer to more or less the same notion, 
that is, the representation of the spatial configuration and the dimension of the body, 
what I call myself a body blueprint. One peculiarity of the body blueprint is that its 
spatial organization differs whether it is used to shape bodily experiences or to guide 
action.  
To recap, some components of the body blueprint are shared between self and 
others, but some components only. This is confirmed by brain imaging studies, which 
never show perfect identity between activation for the self and activation for others. 
For instance, vicarious touch can activate SI, but this hardly exhausts the neural basis 
RI WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI WKH VSDWLDO SURSHUWLHV RI RQH¶V ERG\ ZKLFK LQFOXGHV EUDLQ
areas at a higher level, including the parietal area. There are differences even in visual 
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representations of the body. For example, it was found that in the extrastriate body 
area in the visual cortex, different brain regions selectively responded to images of 
RQH¶V RZQ ERG\ SDUWV RU RWKHU SHRSOH¶V ERG\ SDUWV 0\HUV DQG 6RZGHQ  
Furthermore, it was found an implicit self-advantage in body visual recognition 
(Frassinetti et al., 2008, 2012). Participants were asked to match pictures of body 
parts together. Their performance improved when the pictures displayed their own 
body parts from an egocentric perspective compared to when they display other 
SHRSOH¶V ERG\ SDUWV IURP WKH VDPH SHUVSHFWLYH +HQFH WKH\ ZHUH EHWWHU LQ YLVXDOO\
processing their own body that any other bodies. 
The fact that self and others are not fully confounded is also confirmed by 
neuropsychological dissociations. For example, patients with anorexia nervosa were 
asked to imagine walking through a door-like aperture and then to judge whether or 
not they would be able to walk at a normal speed without turning sideways (Guardia 
et al., 2012). Alternatively they were asked to imagine another person of the same size 
walking through the aperture and to judge whether she could pass. It was found that 
the patients mistakenly judged that they could not pass in apertures in which they 
accurately judged other people could pass. One way to interpret the results is that the 
blueprint of their own body was impaired with no consequence on the representation 
RI RWKHU SHRSOH¶V ERGLHV &RQYHUVHO\ patients with heterotopagnosia have selective 
GLIILFXOWLHVLQORFDWLQJDQRWKHULQGLYLGXDO¶VERG\SDUWVRQKHUERG\EXWQRGLIILFXOW\
on their own body. Rather that pointing on DQRWKHU¶Vbody, they indicate the location 
of the named body part on their own body (Felician et al., 2003). Consequently, 
deficits of the blueprint RI RQH¶V ERG\ do not necessarily lead to intersubjective 
impairments. 
We can then propose the following hypothesis: 
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Janus head hypothesis: Intersubjective correspondence is achieved by 
time-sharing processing of bodily information that is common to the 
blueprint of one's body and the blueprint of other people's bodies. 
On this view, neural resources that were originally designed to represenW RQH¶V
ERGLO\VWDWHVDQGZHUHODWHUVKDSHGWRUHSUHVHQWRWKHUSHRSOH¶VVWDWHVDUH-DQXV-faced. 
7KH\ IDFH LQZDUG DV UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI RQH¶V ERG\ DQG WKH\ IDFH RXWZDUG DV
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIRWKHUSHRSOH¶VERGLHVThey FDQWKXVEULGJHWKHJDSEHWZHHQRQH¶V
boG\DQGRWKHUSHRSOH¶VERGLHVEXWZLWKRXW ORVLQJ the distinction between self and 
others. $W WKH OHYHO RI WKH ERG\ EOXHSULQW UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV RI RQH¶V ERG\ VWLOO GLIIHU
IURP UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV RI RWKHU SHRSOH¶V ERGLHV 7KH\ DUH QRW VKDUHG DQG WKXV WKH\
cannot lead to confusion. It then seems that one can dispense with a ³:KRVH´ system 
despite the existence of shared body representations. The content is not naked at all 
levels. The blueprint RI RQH¶V ERG\ LV QRW H[KDXVWHG E\ ZKDW LV VKDUHG ,W FDQ WKXV
keep its self-specificity, and thus, suffice to ground the sense of body ownership.  
 
Conclusion 
Do we need a ³:KRVH´ system like we have a ³:KR´ system? Here I have 
addressed these questions by analysing the implications of intersubjective 
correspondence for the content of body representations. I have defended a limited 
embodied approach to the problem, according to which intersubjective 
correspondence is encoded in bodily terms in some ± but not all ± situations. There 
are shared body representations endowed with naked content, both in the motor and in 
the perceptual domains, but that they do not exhaust the blueprint of the body, that is, 
the representation of the spatial properties of the body. Some components of the body 
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blueprints are naked, but others are not. Hence, body blueprints do not leave the body 
unattributed. They are thus susceptible to ground the sense of body ownership. It thus 
seems that one can dispense with a WHOSE system despite the existence of shared 
body representations. 
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Action mirroring is considered as evidence of shared action representation, but can it 
be considered as evidence as well of shared body representation?  
 
